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Incorporation of Independent Agencies
into the Executive Branch
The independence of certain federal agencies1 from the executive
branch dates to the 1935 decision of Humphrey's Executor v. United
States.2 The Supreme Court there held that the distinctive expertise and
impartiality of certain agencies justified the power of Congress to insulate
agency officers from removal at will by the President. The case was part
of a general acceptance of a practical and flexible, or "functional", ap-
proach to separation of powers-an approach that has led to independent
agencies being considered a "veritable fourth branch" of government.'
Today, the foundations of Humphrey's Executor are crumbling. From
the functionalist perspective, the distinctive expertise and impartiality of
independent agencies appear much less compelling in the light of a half-
century of experience. Other functional arguments, such as the need for
greater coordination and accountability in agency action, now counsel
against independence. In addition, the new formalism of recent separation
of powers cases, most notably INS v. Chadha,4 suggests a doctrinal chal-
lenge to the entire functionalist approach implicit in Humphrey's Execu-
tor. The Court instead has reemphasized the Constitution's provision for
three and only three branches. In sum, on both functional and formal
grounds, this Note argues that Humphrey's Executor should now be dis-
carded, and independent agencies incorporated into the executive branch.
1. President Reagan's Exec. Order No. 12,291, § l(d), 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), exempts, as inde-
pendent, those agencies specified in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (Supp. V 1981). This section provides:
[Tihe term "independent regulatory agency" means the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Mine Enforcement Safety and Health Review
Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, the Postal Rate Commission, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, and any other similar agency designated by statute as a Fed-
eral independent regulatory agency or commission.
Since the promulgation of Exec. Order No. 12,291, the Civil Aeronautics Board has been disbanded,
49 U.S.C.A. § 1551 (West Supp. 1984), and the Commission on Civil Rights has become independent
by statute. United States Commission on Civil Rights Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-183, § 2(d), 97
Stat. 1301 (1983) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1975 (West Supp. 1984)).
2. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
3. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). As early as 1937, a
report to the President attacked independent agencies as a "headless fourth branch" of government.
PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE U.S. 36 (1937). See Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separa-
tion of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLum. L. REv. 573 (1984).
4. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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I. AGENCY INDEPENDENCE AND THE RISE OF FUNCTIONALISM
The modern law of removal began in 1926, in Myers v. United States,'
which involved the President's removal of a first-class postmaster without
the statutorily-required concurrence of the Senate. Chief Justice Taft de-
livered a strongly formalist opinion, emphasizing the division of all gov-
ernmental power into exactly three branches,6 and stating the principle
that branches must be kept separate except where explicitly "blended" by
the Constitution. 7 The Court held removal to be an exclusively executive
power, and thus not subject to congressional limitation.8
Nine years later the Supreme Court sharply limited Myers in
Humphrey's Executor,9 which still provides the primary legal basis for
agency independence.10 The case invalidated President Roosevelt's re-
moval, contrary to statute, of Federal Trade Commissioner Humphrey.
The distinctive character of Humphrey's office permitted Congress to
limit the President's removal power." The duties of the Commission were
"neither political nor executive,"12 and the Commission's special expertise
and impartiality justified independence from the President.1 The Presi-
dent's "exclusive removal power," established in Myers,"' thereafter ex-
tended only to "purely executive" officers.15
The decision of Humphrey's Executor was part of a major shift to func-
tionalism after 1935. The Supreme Court relaxed the Myers rule that all
governmental actions had to fit into one of the three formal boxes of legis-
5. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Contemporary observers considered the case a major event; the Court had
previously avoided ruling on the power of the President to remove an officer in the face of a contrary
statute. A contemporary observer corroborated the importance of the case in a way surprising to
modern Court observers: "Not since 1899. . .had a supreme court decision on a constitutional ques-
tion captured a prominent place-with headlines to match-on the front page of the morning paper."
E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDEN'S REMOVAL POWER UNDER THE CONsTrruroN at v (1927).
6. 272 U.S. at 116.
7. "[T]he reasonable construction of the Constitution must be that the branches should be kept
separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended, and the Constitution should be ex-
pounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively requires." Id. Accord Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168, 190-91 (1880).
8. The Court said the case presented the question whether "the President has the exclusive power
of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate." 272 U.S. at 106.
9. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
10. See Robinson, The Federal Trade Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA.
L. REV. 169, 207-08 n.89 (1978) (Humphrey's Executor remains primary case on agency
independence).
11. 295 U.S. at 631.
12. Id. at 624.
13. "[I]ts members are called upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts. . ....
Id. "The Commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very nature of its duties, act with
entire impartiality. It is charged with the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law." Id.
14. 272 U.S. at 106.
15. 295 U.S. at 632.
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lative, executive, or judicial action.'" Academic commentators and the
courts supported the New Deal's institutional innovations-hybrid organs
of government with blended powers.' By 1952, Justice Jackson's influen-
tial concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer'8 proposed a
separation of powers doctrine premised on flexibility, 9 practicality,20 and
judicial reluctance to enforce the doctrine based on isolated parts of the
Constitution.2" Functionalism was dominant, but by 1983, when Justice
White followed the functionalist approach closely in INS v. Chadha,22 no
other justice joined his dissent.
II. FUNCTIONALISM AND AGENCY INDEPENDENCE
A. Undermining of Functional Justification for Independence
The erosion of the original functional justification for independence,
combined with the lack of any contemporary difference in agency practice,
leads to the conclusion that there is nothing distinctive today about inde-
pendent agencies that deserves special protection.
16. The majority in Myers required all government actions to fit into one of the three branches.
272 U.S. at 116. See also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-91 (1880) (same requirement of
tripartitism). Humphrey's Executor paid lip service to the separation of government into three
branches, piously expounding "[t]he fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general
departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of
either of the others." 295 U.S. at 629. The opinion's tolerance of the FTC as "predominantly quasi-
judicial and quasi-legislative," id. at 624, and hence outside of any of the three branches, shows that
the Court observed the "fundamental necessity" only in language and not in substance.
By 1940, the Court quickly disposed of a claim that an administrative agency, not part of the
judicial system, could not exercise "judicial power." Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310
U.S. 381 (1940). In Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944), the Court made dear its
functionalist philosophy: "The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government does
not demand. . . the impracticable." But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (adherence to
constitutional text required even though it can "impose burdens on government process that often
seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable").
17. The leading exposition was J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTMATIVE PROCESS 15 (1938). See also
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. RaV. 1667, 1676-81
(1975) ("theory of expertise" dominant in administrative law after 1935).
18. 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952).
19. Jackson proposed "flexible tests" of presidential power that "depend on the imperatives of
events and contemporary imponderables rather than abstract theories of law." Id. at 637, 639.
20. Jackson gave "to the enumerated powers the scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be
reasonable, practical implications instead of the rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism." Id. at
640.
21. "The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial
definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn
from context." Id. at 635.
22. White quoted extensively from Justice Jackson's Youngstown opinion. 462 U.S. 919, 978
(1983) (White, J., dissenting). White's dissent specifically agreed with Jackson's theory of flexibility
in separation of powers: "[O]ur Federal Government was intentionally chartered with the flexibility
to respond to contemporary needs without losing sight of fundamental principles." Id. White's quota-
tion points to an easily-overlooked similarity between functionalism and formalism. Both approaches
can stress the importance of following the constitutional text; White's functionalism demonstrates,
however, the possibility of understanding the text to require flexibility. At issue are canons of inter-
pretation, not reliance on the Constitution vel non.
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1. Decline in the Ideals of Expertise and Impartiality
A rationale of Humphrey's Executor was that the desirability of foster-
ing scientific expertise justified independence of agencies from contamina-
tion by the political process.2" Widespread skepticism toward such agency
claims to expertise has since emerged. 2 Critics have noted that agencies
are prone to "capture" by regulated interests;2 5 agencies' independent, ex-
pert judgment is compromised by pressures to please the regulated com-
munity. Studies have concluded that agency personnel seek to maximize
agency turf rather than any broader public interest.2 ' A series of reports
have concluded that agencies have consistently failed to attract high qual-
ity personnel deserving of the term "expert. 2 7 Finally, agencies have
failed to achieve objective expertise even for what would seem strictly
technical matters, such as nuclear power.28
Congress has responded to these criticisms, not by reenforcing the inde-
pendence of "expert" agencies, but rather by attempting to ensure agency
23. 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935). The Court recognized the intent of Congress to create a body of
experts, id., and accepted Congress' characterization of the agency as distinct from executive agencies,
id. at 628; see also Breyer, Afterword, 92 YALE L.J. 1614, 1615-16 (1983) (1930's ideal of expert,
scientific administration).
24. Critics on both the political left and right have explained the history of passage of regulation
and regulatory legislation as the use of governmental powers for sectional or private gain-the oppo-
site of regulation viewed as the triumph of apolitical expertise. Compare G. KoLKO, RAILROADS AND
REGULATION, 1877-1916, at 239 (1965) (progressivism as the triumph of "political capitalism") with
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCi. 3, 3 (1971) (neoclassi-
cal economic theory that regulation is "designed and operated primarily for [industry's] benefit"). For
a review of part of the immense literature, see Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline Deregulation
and the Public Interest, LAW & CONTEmp. PROBs., Winter 1981, at 179 & n.2.
25. According to this theory, administrators, in low visibility positions and cut off from political
accountability, become "captured" by the regulated interests, upon whom they depend for information
and for whom they often work upon leaving the agency. See M. BERNSTFIN, REGULATING BUSINESS
BY INDEPENDENT COMMSSION 155-60 (1955); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 72-93 (1969). In a related theory, Olson has
shown the advantages of small size to the achievement of collective benefits to a group. See M. OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 33-36 (1971).
In accord with this theory, agencies may well be subject to lobbying by small, well-organized groups
(such as an industry lobby) disproportionate to that by larger groups (such as a consumer lobby). The
larger groups can often offer only diffuse benefits to members-benefits which in many cases will not
be sufficient to justify the costs of political participation.
26. See R. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: A THEORY OF INFLUENCE 20-21
(1979); W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36, 42 (1971).
27. See, e.g., J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
137-39 (1960); U.S. COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, THE
HOOVER COMM'N REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GoVERNMENT
431 (1949); U.S. PREsmENT's ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGU-
LATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 41-43
(1971).
28. The extremely technical nature of nuclear power has not protected the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission, from recurrent charges of incompe-
tence and of bias in favor of nuclear power and against safety. See, e.g., R. NADER & J. ABBOTTS,
THE MENACE OF ATOMIC ENERGY 273-83 (rev. ed. 1979). The possibility of value-free science, a
logical predicate for the exercise of power by neutral experts, has itself been sharply challenged. See
Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. RE'. 817, 819 (1977).
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accountability. Recent statutes have constrained discretion with a variety
of "agency-forcing" procedures.29 Most prominently, Congress attempted
to ensure accountability through widespread statutory use of the legisla-
tive veto 3 0-a device that substituted the judgment of Congress for that of
the supposedly expert agency.31 Thus, expertise is not only an ideal that
agencies have failed to achieve, but also one largely irrelevant to a contem-
porary evaluation of agency independence.
The ideal that agency impartiality requires independence from political
pressures has experienced a similar decline. The criticisms of expertise,
such as agency "capture," also suggest that agencies are not impartial.
The increased and widely accepted use of rulemaking, 2 with its balancing
of political considerations, has deliberately reduced agency insulation from
external political debate. 3 The widespread statutory employment of the
legislative veto indicates that Congress values accountability more highly
than independence from political concerns. 4 In addition, within each
agency, the level of impartiality required of individual decisionmakers has
been substantially reduced. 5
29. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSI.ER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 3-12 (1981) (history and moti-
vation of congressional desire to prescribe agency implementation of statutes).
30. The legislative veto was held unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See
infra text accompanying notes 81-93. Judge Breyer has defined the legislative veto as "a clause in a
statute, which says that a particular executive [or independent agency] action. . . will take effect only
if Congress does not nullify it by resolution within a specified period of time." Breyer, The Legislative
Veto After Chadha, 72 GEo. L.J. 785, 785 (1984).
31. See cases cited infra note 92.
32. Between 1962 and 1978 over forty major pieces of legislation were passed dealing with health,
safety, and environmental regulation. R. LrrAN & W. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULA-
TION 44 (1983). The implementation of this mass of legislation occurred largely through rulemaking,
which offered several advantages over case-by-case adjudication: Rules are published and prospective;
they provide standards for measuring legality and constraining agency discretion; they offer proce-
dural and participatory protections beyond the named parties; and they extend to all regulated parties
upon promulgation, rather than having binding effect only upon the named parties.
33. Stewart describes the rise of "the model of interest representation" in administrative law after
about 1960. Stewart, supra note 17, at 1723-90. This model rejects the ideal of agency impartiality:
"[A]gency policy has become in large degree a function of bargaining and exchange with and among
the competing private interests whom the agency is supposed to rule." Id. at 1760. Independent
agency officers are now allowed to participate in rulemaking absent a "clear and convincing showing"
of an "unalterably closed mind." Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1154 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). Thus, the ideal of impartiality has been substantially
undermined even in the agency found to be independent and impartial in Humphrey's Executor.
34. The threat of a legislative veto would seem to add some of the heat of politics to the "coldest
neutrality" once required of the independent Interstate Commerce Commission. ICC v. Chicago, R.I.
& Pac. Ry., 218 U.S. 88, 102 (1910).
35. The reduced requirement of impartiality is seen most dearly in the case of commissioners of
independent agencies, who now often exercise both rulemaking and adjudicatory authority. This Note
points out the decline of the ideal of impartiality with respect to these officers, and advocates that they
be removable by the President. For lesser officials, such as administrative law judges (ALJ's), the
general movement towards separation and insulation of functions within an agency indicates the con-
tinuing importance of impartiality for purely adjudicatory officials. See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, &
P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 752-59 (7th ed. 1979) (rise in stature
of ALJ's). The need to protect adjudication remains separate from the point that impartiality today
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No other ideals that require independence are evident. 6 Given the ap-
parent impossibility of achieving even close approximations to neutral ex-
pertise and impartiality, and given the normative reasons favoring ac-
countability over the two ideals, the need for independence no longer
justifies placement of agencies outside of the executive branch.
2. Convergence of Modes of Functioning
Any original distinction between executive and independent agencies
based on their modes of function3 7 has disappeared in the half-century
since Humphrey's Executor. Both then and later, the functional 8 basis for
independence evidently depended on the mode of agency action: Apolitical
adjudication was independent, while more political actions such as the
making of substantive rules"9 remained in the executive branch.4°
does not distinguish independent agencies in any way from executive agencies.
36. The text refers to the lack of justifications of independence for its own sake. For discussion of
arguments for independence based on opposition to presidential power, see infra text accompanying
notes 108-119.
37. "Mode of function" is a particular sort of activity of government, including rulemaking, adju-
dicating, licensing, ratemaking, and investigating. For most purposes, the first four of the above can be
analyzed in terms of the extremes of political rulemaking and apolitical adjudication. But see infra
note 119 (discussion of ratemaking power of the Federal Reserve Board).
38. Distinguishing among three meanings of "function" clarifies the relationship between formal-
ism and functionalism. The first meaning is the overall goal, as in "the primary 'function' of separa-
tion of powers is to prevent tyranny." See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1975) (per curiam);
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Functionalism and formalism
share this goal. Functionalism seeks directly to achieve this and subsidiary goals, such as the assurance
of impartiality and expertise, through balancing of practical considerations. Formalism, in contrast,
attempts to prevent tyranny by preventing any branch from overstepping the restraints provided in the
constitutional text. A second meaning of function refers to the three "functions" of government, as
exercised by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The three functions do not correspond
precisely with the three branches; the President's veto, for instance, although exercised by the execu-
tive branch, is part of the legislative function. Formalism posits that each branch should act only in
pursuit of its named function, except when the Constitution specifically indicates an exception. See
supra note 7. Functionalism allows exceptions in addition to those explicitly listed in the Constitution
when pragmatic considerations so dictate. The third meaning of "function" refers to the various modes
of function by which government operates, such as rulemaking and adjudication. Functionalism has
used the mode of function of adjudication as a criterion for justifying independence: Independence is
one way to foster agency impartiality and expertise and to avoid possibly excessive concentration of
power in the President's hands.
39. The FTC was granted the power to issue rules of practice and procedure by the Federal
Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 6, 38 Stat. 717, 721 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 46
(1982)). The FTC did not promulgate its first substantive rule until 1971. See National Petroleum
Refiners Ass'n. v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding FTC substantive rulemaking
authority), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
40. Such a functional distinction is supported by Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958),
the only presidential removal case the Supreme Court has decided since Humphrey's Executor. In
reaffirming the latter case, the Court in Wiener stated the functional test: "[The most reliable factor
for drawing an inference regarding the President's power of removal in our case is the nature of the
function that Congress vested in the War Claims Commission." Id. at 353. In its holding, the Court
made clear the nature of that function, rejecting "the claim that the President could remove a member
of an adjudicatory body like the War Claims Commission." Id. at 356 (emphasis added). See also
Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("The fundamental justifi-
cation for making agencies independent is that since they exercise adjudicatory powers requiring
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Such a distinction was imperfect in 1935. Contrary to the Court's weak
argument in Humphrey's Executor, the FTC itself had clearly executive
functions in 1935.41 Also, at that time, independent agencies such as the
Interstate Commerce Commission made extensive substantive rules.42
Even assuming the distinction was valid in the earlier period, there has
been a dramatic shift to agency action through rulemaking during the last
twenty-five years,'3 a shift in which independent agencies have partici-
pated fully.44 Executive agencies also adjudicate extensively;' 5 the Social
Security Administration, an executive branch agency, "operates the largest
system of administrative adjudication in the Western world."4 The same
procedural safeguards that ensure the impartiality of executive branch ad-
judications' 7 can apply to independent agencies-further "independence"
is not necessary. 4 Thus, contrary to the assertion of Humphrey's Execu-
tor, there is no distinctive character of independent agencies; they act in
the same ways as do executive agencies.4
impartial expertise, political interference is undesirable.") (emphasis added), affid sub nom. Process
Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
41. The Court asserted that the FrC acted "in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-
judicially," 295 U.S. at 628, but was "neither political nor executive," id. at 624. In describing the
FTC's quasi-legislative duties, however, the Court could point only to the FTC's "making investiga-
tions and reports thereon for the information of Congress under § 6, in aid of the legislative power."
Id. at 628. As the Court recognized in a footnote, however, the FTC in 1935 also had the power to
investigate and make reports thereon for the information of the President. Id. at 628 n.*. The Court
nevertheless maintained that this latter investigative power was "so obviously collateral to the main
design of the act as not to detract from the force of this general statement" about the quasi-judicial
and quasi-legislative nature of the FTC. Id. In light of the identical dual grant of investigative power,
there was nothing in the functions performed by the FTC in 1935 which made it any more a quasi-
legislative than a quasi-executive agency.
42. See, e.g., St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1908) (upholding setting of
standard by ICC under Safety Appliance Act of 1903, ch. 196, § 5, 27 Stat. 531); Delaware &
Hudson Co. v. United States, 5 F.2d 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1925) (upholding ICC rules relating to installa-
tion of automatic train-stop and other safety devices under Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 441,
41 Stat. 498-99); see also R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONs 428 (1941)
(importance of voluminous safety and other regulations of ICC).
43. Antonin Scalia has described "what is perhaps the most notable development in federal gov-
ernment administration during the past two decades . . . the constant and accelerating flight away
from individualized, adjudicatory proceedings to generalized disposition through rulemaking." Scalia,
Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 345, 376.
44. Id. at 376-82, and cases cited at 382 n.156.
45. Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 472 n.198 ("Executive agencies perform
the same adjudicatory and rulemaking functions as do independent agencies."), affd sub nom. Process
Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983).
46. J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 18 (1983).
47. The Supreme Court has upheld executive agency adjudications against due process challenges.
In holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of Social Security
disability benefits, the Court said: "[Tlhe prescribed procedures not only provide the claimant with an
effective process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative action, but also assure a right to an
evidentiary hearing, as well as to subsequent judicial review, before the denial of his claim becomes
final." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
48. See infra note 116.
49. This is not to go so far as Strauss, supra note 3, at 596, who denies any significant difference
in presidential relations with executive and independent agencies. That both sorts of agencies use the
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B. Functional Arguments Favoring Incorporation
A functional analysis of incorporation today must weigh the diminished
importance of expertise and impartiality against arguments favoring in-
corporation. In addition to the formalist arguments for incorporation dis-
cussed below,"0 the functionalist arguments for incorporation include the
executive's ability to coordinate regulatory policy and the new importance,
given the invalidation of the legislative veto, of assuring agency
accountability.
1. Coordinating Agency Policy
The present need for coordination of agency policy supports a greater
presidential role in regulation,5" and may be persuasive even to many of
those generally skeptical of presidential power.5" The history of creating a
new agency to address each new national issue has led to a plethora of
single-issue agencies, each narrowly focused on the demands of its own
issue area. With the enormous increase since the Great Society in the
amount of regulation, 3 the costs of inconsistent or duplicative regulation
have risen."
The President, elected nationally,55 charged with executing all federal
laws, and accountable for the sum-total of executive action, has a unique
potential to balance and coordinate agency action.56 Through the use of
same modes of function, such as rulemaking and adjudication, leaves open the possibility that the
President's powers to remove, to issue binding executive orders, and to supervise agency enforcement
result, in general, in greater presidential control over executive agencies.
50. See infra Part II.
51. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON LAw & THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO
REFoRM (1979) [hereinafter cited as ROADS TO REFORM]; Bernstein, The Presidential Role in Ad-
ministrative Rulemaking: Improving Policy Directives: One Vote for Not Tying the President's
Hands, 57 TuL L. REv. 818 (1982); Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84
YALE L.J. 1395 (1975).
52. See infra text accompanying notes 108-119 (responses to fears of excessive presidential
power).
53. For the amount of new regulatory legislation, see supra note 32. While it is notoriously diffi-
cult to calculate the total costs of regulation, estimates reviewed by one study, not including benefits,
ranged from $31 billion to $78 billion, in 1977 dollars, for each year between 1975 and 1980. R.
LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 32, at 25.
54. One study detailed sixteen different agencies responsible for often-overlapping aspects of en-
ergy policy. ROADS TO REFORM, supra note 51, at 71-72.
The frequency of overlapping jurisdiction makes likely the occurrence of "cumulatively excessive"
regulation, in which multiple agencies issue rules that are cost-justified in isolation but cumulatively
excessive in impact; the likelihood of cumulatively excessive regulation was an important spur to
passage of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2812 (codified
at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2904, 2905, 3501 to 3520 (1982)); S. REP. No. 630, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, re-
printed in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6241, 6243.
55. The unmatched intensity of political discourse that surrounds modern presidential elections is
an additional reason to believe the President is uniquely accountable to the popular will.
56. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948 (1983) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
123 (1926)) (President in some respects more representative than legislature).
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executive orders, recent Presidents have attempted to reduce these regula-
tory costs.5 7 Such orders have been necessarily incomplete because of the
relatively limited executive authority over independent agencies.58 Given
the extensive role of independent agencies in modem regulation, the need
for coordination supports incorporation.
2. Accountability and Agency Independence
Given the decline in the ideals of expertise and impartiality, accounta-
bility to the political branches has become an increasingly important basis
for the legitimacy of agency action. Accountability is antithetical to the
idea of independence59-accountability is to some other branch, to Con-
gress or the Executive. 0 After the invalidation of the legislative veto in
Chadha,61 Congress faces increased difficulties in monitoring and control-
ling specific agency actions. Indeed, both Congress62 and its supporter in
Chadha, Justice White,6" have explicitly stated that the legislative veto
was essential to effective accountability to Congress."
In comparison, the President has certain advantages. The powers to
57. Presidents Reagan, Carter, and Ford all issued executive orders calling for cost/benefit analy-
sis of proposed agency regulations. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982); Exec. Order No.
12,044, 3 C.F.R. § 152 (1979); Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3A C.F.R. § 203 (1974).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 97-99. Some, but not all, independent agencies acquiesced
to presidential requests to participate in the cost/benefit reviews. Strauss, supra note 3, at 593 n.78.
59. "Indeed, it is ironic that Congressional amid attempt to place great significance on the Com-
mission's independence and on the need for having a politically accountable check on the agency's
decision. The fundamental justification for making agencies independent is that. . . political interfer-
ence is undesirable." Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd
sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). See
also Brief of Amici Curiae United States Senate and the Speaker of the United States House of
Representatives at 45, Consumer Energy Council, supra, ("special appropriateness" of "democratic
accountability" to Congress in agency rulemaking affecting matters historically regulated by states)
[hereinafter cited as Congressional Amid Brief].
60. In practice, such accountability is always shared by the two branches, and their relative
strength varies with the intricate eddies of Washington politics. Furthermore, as also suggested by
Strauss, supra note 3, at 586 n.46, Presidents may have relatively great ability to slow or halt agency
enforcement or other action. In contrast, increased presidential power to hold agencies accountable
may become more important during an activist administration, where the President seeks to coordinate
agency initiatives.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 81-93.
62. See supra note 59.
63. Justice White described the legislative veto as "an important if not indispensable political
invention that . . . assures the accountability of independent regulatory agencies . . . ." INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 972 (White, J., dissenting). He elaborated upon this point in his dissent to the
case striking down the legislative veto as applied to independent agencies, where he stated that invali-
dation of the legislative veto "merely guarantees that the independent agencies, once created, for all
practical purposes are a fourth branch of government not subject to the direct control of either Con-
gress or the executive branch. I cannot believe the Constitution commands such a result." Process Gas
Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556, 3558 (1983). Whites argument for
accountability, once the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto is established, becomes an argument
for accountability to the only remaining branch-to the President.
64. See supra note 59; see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 973 n.10 (White, J., dissenting) (Justice
White's analysis of inadequacies of alternatives to legislative veto).
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appoint, to remove, and to issue binding executive orders 5 can affect
agency action without resort to the lengthy and often blunt process of leg-
islation. Recent history offers several examples of popular sentiment ap-
parently influencing the President, who in turn induced agencies to con-
form to that sentiment-the very model of accountability.6 In the
aftermath of Chadha, the President appears to have significant advantages
over the Congress in assuring agency accountability. As with coordination,
the need for accountability now supports incorporation.
III. FORMALISM AND AGENCY INDEPENDENCE
Not only are the specific functional bases for independence now under-
mined, but the entire functionalist approach to separation of powers, first
accepted by the courts in the mid-thirties, is now being sharply limited. In
recent cases, the Supreme Court has espoused a new formalism that re-
jects the functionalist tenets of flexibility, practicality, and reluctance to
enforce the doctrine of separation of powers based on isolated parts of the
Constitution.67 The historical link between functionalism and agency in-
dependence, given the decline of the former, makes the latter appear in-
creasingly anomalous. In the absence of some new basis for independence,
the anomaly calls for the incorporation advocated by this Note.
Recent cases have returned toward the formalist rule in Myers that
branches may blend their powers-may share in the direction of particu-
lar government actions-only where affirmatively permitted by the Con-
stitution. A formal reading of the constitutional text results in tripartit-
ism-permission for only the three branches created by the Constitution.
Language from several recent cases corroborates such a return to
tripartitism.
A. Buckley v. Valeo
In Buckley v. Valeo,68 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the ap-
pointment procedure of the independent Federal Election Commission
(FEC), under which Congress nominated four of the six voting Commis-
65. See infra text accompanying notes 94-99 (effects of incorporation on removal power and
power to issue binding executive orders).
66. Examples include the departures of Anne Burford from the Environmental Protection Agency
and James Watt from the Department of the Interior. Policies in both agencies moderated after the
change in agency head. See N.Y. Times, May 20, 1984, § 1, at 30, col. 3 (new EPA Administrator,
William Ruckelshaus, "widely credited with restoring ... credibility" to the agency); N.Y. Times,
Feb. 21, 1984, at B8, col. 3 (large changes at Interior under new Secretary William Clark). Another
example concerns the Social Security Administration. In response to intense political criticism, Presi-
dent Reagan ordered SSA to halt terminations of disability recipients. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1984, at
Al, col. 6.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 16-22.
68. 424 U.S. 1 (1975) (per curiam).
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sioners.6 9 In forbidding Congress to nominate officials exercising powers
beyond the "legislative" powers Congress could delegate to its own com-
mittees °70 the Court gave an expressly formalist interpretation of the ap-
pointments clause.7 1 Saying that the three branches must remain "largely
separate," '7 the Court held that a statute could not justify Congress' shar-
ing the appointment power with the President in a way not permitted by
the Constitution.7 3
In conformance with the Myers rule against blending,7' the Court
stated in strong terms the exclusive power of the executive branch to direct
all enforcements in the courts made in the name of the United States.75
The Court thereby threw into doubt the constitutionality of various stat-
utes under which the executive branch shares the enforcement power with
certain independent agencies."6
Most importantly for the future status of independent agencies, the
Court for the first time gave a substantive definition to "officer of the
United States."7 7 In striking down the statute's scheme for the appoint-
69. Under the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §
310(a), 88 Stat. 1263, 1280-81 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 437c (1982)), the FEC had six
voting members, two appointed by the President, two by the President pro tempore of the Senate, and
two by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, all six of whom were subject to confirmation by
a majority vote of both houses of Congress.
70. 424 U.S. at 137.
71. The Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeals had characterized the argument based on
the appointments clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, as "strikingly syllogistic," 424 U.S at 119,
that is, as formalist. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court relied on that argument to hold the Act uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 140-41.
72. "[T]he intent of the Framers [was] that the powers of the three great branches of the National
Government be largely separate from one another." Id. at 120. The further suggestion in Buckley that
the branches need not be "hermetically sealed," id. at 121, was later interpreted to mean that each
branch should "as nearly as possible . . . confine itself to its [constitutionally] assigned responsibil-
ity." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 (emphasis added).
73. 424 U.S. at 140-41.
74. See supra note 7.
75. Concerning litigation in the courts of the United States, "it is clear that all such suits, so far
as the interests of the United States are concerned, are subject to the direction, and within the control
of, the Attorney-General." 424 U.S. at 139 (quoting Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454,
458-59 (1869)). The Court also said:
The Commission's enforcement power, exemplified by its discretionary power to seek judicial
relief, is authority that cannot possibly be regarded as merely in aid of the legislative function
of Congress. A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the Presi-
dent, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to 'take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.' Art. II, § 3.
424 U.S. at 138.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 100-102 (enforcement power after incorporation).
77. The definition of "officer" derives from the appointments clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl.
2, which provides:
[The President] shall appoint. . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Con-
gress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Historically, "officer" and "inferior officer" were distinguished by the method of appointment; some-
one nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate was an "officer," while someone ap-
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ment of FEC Commissioners by Congress, the Court held as a matter of
constitutional law that the Commissioners exercised "significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States," and were thus "officers. "78
This new definition of "officer", when combined with the demise of the
functional distinction between executive and independent agencies, ap-
pears to confirm the President's removal power over independent agency
heads. Myers and Humphrey's Executor agreed on the President's illimita-
ble removal power over executive officers, although Humphrey's Executor
exempted the Federal Trade Commissioner on functionalist grounds. As
discussed earlier,79 however, there appears to be no basis today for a func-
tional distinction between executive and independent agencies. The lack of
a distinction thus leads to the conclusion that all agency heads are execu-
tive officers, and thereby subject to the President's removal power. The
import of Buckley is that Congress loses any previous ability to define
agency heads as "inferior officers" or "employees"; the constitutional
holding that heads of agencies are "officers" eliminates the escape hatch
that would otherwise have been available."0
B. INS v. Chadha
The new formalism reached its fullest development in INS v.
Chadha,81 which held the legislative veto unconstitutional. Three factors
support both a formalist interpretation of Chadha, and consequent incor-
pointed by the President, the courts, or a department head, without Senate confirmation, was an
"inferior officer." Lesser governmental officials were "employees." See Burkoff, Appointment and
Removal Power under the Federal Constitution: The Impact of Bucldey v. Valeo, 22 WAYNE L.
REv. 1335, 1342-57 (1976) (history of case law under appointments clause). The boundaries among
"officer," "inferior officer," and "employee" remain muddy. See id. at 1357-69 (Buckley's effect on
meaning of "officer"). One sensible resolution would be to apply a general rule of categorization
according to the method of appointment, while recognizing that an agency head, due to the importance
of the office and the special role in aiding the President in execution of the laws, must be an "officer."
But see infra note 80 (proposing exceptions to such a rule).
78. 424 U.S. at 126.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 23-36 (undermining of functionalist distinctions).
80. Absent the substantive definition of officer, Congress would have had the power, for instance,
to insulate an agency head from removal by lodging the responsibility for appointment with the head
of some department. Such congressional power to change the formal characteristics of an office sug-
gests that the courts, if they are to maintain the substantive definition, will not in all cases be able to
categorize a non-agency head as "officer" or "inferior officer" based simply on the manner of
appointment.
81. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
An earlier theory arguing for the expansion of presidential control over independent agencies was
proposed by Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 (1979).
This Note agrees with Bruff in some respects, especially with his policy arguments for expanded
presidential control of independent agencies, id. at 454-56, 461-63, and his assertion that the distinc-
tion between executive and independent agencies "is belied by practice," id. at 480. However, writing
before Chadha and Northern Pipeline, Bruff could not fully take into account the emerging formal-
ism of the Burger Court. The recent cases support more than Bruff's limited claims to presidential
control of independent agencies.
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poration of independent agencies into the executive branch. First, the
holding of unconstitutionality rested squarely on a formalist reading of the
presentment and bicameralism clauses, 2 indicating a rejection, without
even an assessment of practical desirability, 3 of an institutional arrange-
ment not specified by the Constitution. Independent agencies, even if func-
tionally desirable, similarly lack firm anchor in the constitutional text."4
Second, the opinion indicates that the formalist attitude extends to tripar-
titism. The Court opened its discussion of separation of powers by stating
that the Constitution divides the government's powers into "three defined
categories." '8 5 The majority's acceptance of tripartitism-its rejection of
82. To invalidate the legislative veto, the Court relied on the presentment clauses, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3, which guarantee the presidential veto power, and the bicameral requirement for
passage of a law, U.S. CONST art. I, §§ 1 & 7, cl. 2. The Court's awareness of its formalist reliance
on text is revealed by its mention, 462 U.S. at 946, of the similarity of the reliance in Buckley on the
text of the appointments clause.
83. The Court conceded the functionalist concern that adherence to constitutional text can "im-
pose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable. .. ."
462 U.S. at 959. Nonetheless, the majority affirmed its belief in conformance to the text: "With all the
obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet found a better way to
preserve freedom than by making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints
spelled out in the Constitution." Id.
In another example of such a rejection, a plurality used a formalist interpretation of the Article III
"judicial power" to find unconstitutional a congressional grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality
opinion). The opinion relied exclusively on doctrine drawn from Article III, rather than on any func-
tionalist evaluation of the statute's practical desirability.
84. But see Strauss, supra note 3, at 640. Strauss proposes that agencies not "be regarded as
having been placed in one or another branch but rather . . as subordinate bodies subject to the
controls of all three." In addition to conflicting with the other reasons given in this Note for expanded
presidential control, Strauss's position would apparently permit Congress to set limits on the ability of
the President to remove officers intimately linked to presidential policies, such as the Secretary of
State or the Attorney-General. Such limits would strike at the core of the President's duty to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," as required by U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. See Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. at 131 (parading horrible of "men who by their inefficient service under [the
President], by their lack of loyalty to the service, or by their different views of policy, might make his
taking care that the laws be faithfully executed most difficult or impossible").
85. "The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new federal government into
three defined categories, Legislative, Executive and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each
Branch of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility." 462 U.S. at 951. The Court
then turned to analysis of "the powers delegated to the three Branches," id. at 2784 (emphasis added),
without the slightest hint that powers remain outside of those three branches. See also Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. at 57 (emphasis on "three distinct
Branches"). Interpretation of the Court's use of "three" to mean "three and only three" is supported
by its apparent reliance on the formalist rule of construction expressio unius est excludio alterius
("the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other"). For instance, the Court suggested the
rule by considering exceptions to bicameralism and then stating "congressional authority is not to be
implied." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956; see Elliott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution,
The Constitution, and The Legislative Veto, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 125, 139-44 (discussing expressio
unius). Elliott's three reasons for declaring the maxim inappropriate in constitutional interpretation
do not apply to the question of the constitutionality of the fourth branch. First, Elliott says the list of
specific members of a class might not have been intended as exhaustive; however, there exists no
reasonable argument that the Framers intended any more than three branches. Second, Elliott points
out that general permissive language may contradict the premise that the drafters intended the enu-
meration to be exhaustive; however, there exists no general, permissive language to support a fourth
branch. Third, Elliott argues that "linguistic aids to ascertaining the intent of 'the Draftsmen' should
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any "fourth branch"-is underscored by a striking linguistic disregard for
the distinction between executive and independent agencies. The majority
repeatedly subsumed both executive and independent sorts of agencies
under the term "administrative agency," '86 a sign of the trend, also evident
in other recent cases,8 7 toward a blurring of the executive-independent
distinction."8 In marked contrast, Justice White 9 and other critics of
Chadha" have scrupulously retained the distinction-in dissent. The
third factor linking Chadha to incorporation is the immediate extension of
Chadha to independent agencies. The Supreme Court rejected congres-
sional claims to special control over independent agencies91 when it sum-
carry relatively little weight in interpreting the Constitution." Id. at 140. However, granted a legiti-
mate skepticism about our ability to comprehend the language of a clause torn from context, tripartit-
ism would still seem to be quite firmly grounded. The theory that the Constitution creates three and
only three branches relies not only on the specific clauses establishing the legislative, executive, and
judicial powers, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 1; art. III, § 1, but also on the basic structure of the
document-a fourth branch can be implied only in the face of three and only three articles that
constitute the basic institutions of government.
Beginning with the overarching formalist rule that permits blending of branches only where affirm-
atively permitted by the Constitution, the new formalism has held, among other things: (1) that the
appointments clause bars appointment procedures not listed therein, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
137 (1975) (per curiam); (2) that the presentment clauses bar legislation not in conformity with the
specified presentment procedure, Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956; and (3) that the bicameralism require-
ments forbid legislation except as provided by the constitutional text, id. at 955-56. In this context of
expressio unius, the Chadha majority's use of "three branches" thus seems strongly to suggest the
interpretation "three and only three branches."
86. None of the majority's six uses of the term "administrative" showed any hint of a distinction
between executive and independent agencies. 462 U.S. at 951, 953 n.16 (three times), 955 n.19, 957
n.22. The only use of "independent" in the agency context was in a description of legislative veto
statutes passed by Congress. Id. at 2781. That is, the Court recognized independent agencies only
within statutes found unconstitutional by its holding.
87. Justice Brennan, writing in dissent for Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, recently
wrote: "[I]t is difficult to conceive of an expenditure for which the last governmental actor. . . is not
an Executive Branch official." Valley Forge College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 511 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Brennan has
also used "administrative" in the inclusive sense, later used in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
Chadha, to indicate both executive and independent agencies. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 n.18 (1982) (plurality opinion).
88. "Administrative agency" has historically been synonymous with "independent agency." See,
e.g., J. LANDIS, supra note 17, at 2-3. In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935), and Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), the only two Supreme Court removal cases
since the rise of functionalism, there is no use of "administrative" for any activity within the executive
branch. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, at issue in Chadha, is part of the Justice De-
partment, a clearly executive agency.
89. Justice White insisted at every opportunity-ten times-on distinguishing executive from in-
dependent agencies. 462 U.S. at 972, 980, 984, 985, 986, 987, 989, 998, 999, 1002.
90. Note the distinction in one title: Levitas &'Brand, Congressional Review of Executive and
Agency Actions After Chadha: "The Son of Legislative Veto" Lives On, 72 GEo. L.J. 801 (1984); see
also id. at 805 (discussing actions of "executive and independent agencies").
91. "FERC performs only those functions as assigned to it by Congress; it derives no independent
authority from the Constitution, and separation of powers principles do not apply to it." Congres-
sional Amid Brief, supra note 59, at 40-41 (emphasis added).
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marily affirmed two cases"2 invalidating legislative vetos of independent
agency action.93
IV. CHANGES IN AGENCY INDEPENDENCE
Under either formalism or functionalism, the central tension is between
the power of the President to execute the laws and the power of Congress
to establish and shape agencies by statute. With respect to this tension, the
developments described in this Note have little or no effect upon the Presi-
dent's power over the agencies already in the executive branch. The "in-
corporation" of independent agencies is essentially a matter of specifying
the ways now-independent agencies will become the same as now-
executive agencies. The implications of incorporation are similar, but not
necessarily identical, whether incorporation is based on either formalist or
functionalist arguments, or both.
A. Implications of Formalism for Agency Independence
The new formalism implies four conclusions concerning incorporation:
(1) an expansion of the President's removal power to independent agen-
cies; (2) a similar expansion of the power to issue binding executive or-
ders; (3) possibly, an expansion of the President's powers to coordinate
enforcement in the courts; and (4) the permissibility of purely investiga-
tory agencies outside of the executive branch.
Since Myers, the President's power to remove executive officers has
been secure.94 With incorporation of independent agencies into the execu-
tive branch, all agency "officers" become subject to that removal power.' 5
92. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), afg
Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States Senate v. FTC,
103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983), affg Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
Contrast the seeming identity of independent and executive agencies in the two cases with the insis-
tence of the Court in Humphrey's Executor that the duties of the FTC were "neither political nor
executive." 295 U.S. at 624.
93. Still unanalyzed are at least two aspects of the new formalism. First, the new formalism
operates on law, not politics. The majority in Chadha believed that formalism sufficiently answered
the main thrust of Justice White's dissent-that the political power of the modem presidency requires
the check of the legislative veto. Second, and relatedly, the new formalism has not yet justified itself.
The stated goal of separation of powers is to prevent the possibility of tyranny. See supra note 38.
Nothing in that goal, or in the opinions of the Court thus far, explains why the Court now stresses
formalism, rather than an updated functionalism.
One might speculate that the Court has lost faith in its ability to discover and guide political checks
and balances. Or, the Court's earlier reliance on functionalism might have threatened to undermine
the role of the Court as expounder of the Constitution. Whatever the rationale, the new formalism is
current law, and law which by its own logic leaves no place for independent agencies.
94. Courts have continued to uphold the President's power to remove executive officers. E.g.,
Martin v. Tobin, 451 F.2d 1335, 1336 (9th Cir. 1971); Martin v. Reagan, 525 F.Supp. 110, 113 (D.
Mass. 1981).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
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It is important to note, however, another rule approved in Myers, that
Congress retains the power to prescribe by statute the grounds for removal
of "inferior officers" and "employees."" 6 While the exact line between
"officers" and these latter officials remains unclear, Buckley appears to
hold that agency heads are "officers." Incorporation would thus mean that
all agency heads are removable.
A second implication of incorporation involves the power of the Presi-
dent to issue executive orders binding on now-independent agencies. Pres-
idents have traditionally refrained from imposing executive orders on in-
dependent agencies in the absence of statutory permission,97 although they
have asserted the right to do so."' The strengthened tripartitism of the
new formalism would assure the executive the power to bind both now-
independent and now-executive agencies equally.99
A possible third implication of incorporation concerns the scope of the
President's oversight of enforcement of civil suits in the name of the
United States. The Court in Buckley stated in very strong language that
the responsibility for all such suits is entrusted to the President, and hence
96. Myers upheld the exclusive removal power of the President over a first-class postmaster ap-
pointed by the President. The broad executive power of the President, to be effective, required the
power to remove subordinates when they could no longer execute his orders. In addition, the power of
appointment by the President carried with it, by necessary implication, the power of removal. 272
U.S. at 117-19. Neither principle applied to presidential removal of an inferior officer where the
appointment power was lodged in the head of a department. Id. at 127 (citing United States v. Per-
kins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886)). Congress thus apparently retains authority to prescribe grounds of
removal for inferior officers appointed by heads of departments, and afortiori for employees, who are
even more distant from the President.
97. For instance, Presidents Reagan, Carter, and Ford all refrained from including independent
agencies within the scope of executive orders concerned with cost/benefit analysis of proposed regula-
tions. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. § 152
(1979); Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3A C.F.R. § 203 (1974); see also supra note 1 (quoting President
Reagan's executive order). Such restraint probably has occurred in large part out of presidential re-
luctance to fight Congress on the issue. See Letter from Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs to
President Carter (Dec. 16, 1977) (concerning proposed Executive Order on Federal Regulation), re-
printed in Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 170 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Hearing]. This letter consisted of a detailed legal argument that the proposed extension of the
executive order to independent agencies was outside presidential authority. Incorporation of indepen-
dent agencies into the executive branch would eliminate the legal basis for such congressional opposi-
tion and dramatically reduce the political costs for the President of extending executive orders to
independent agencies.
98. See Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum on Proposed Executive Order on Federal Regula-
tion 7, reprinted in Hearing, supra note 97, at 158 ("[U]nder the best view of the law" the proposed
executive order, eventually issued as Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982), "can be im-
posed on the independent agencies").
99. While this Note concludes that the President should have the power to issue executive orders
equally binding on all agencies, it makes no special assumption about the scope of that power. Execu-
tive orders have their effect within frameworks established by statutes; the President's power to exe-
cute the laws extends only to the direction of policy within statutorily permissible limits. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) ("IT]he President's power to see that the laws
are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."), quoted in INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. at 953 n.16.
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is within the control of his agent, the Attorney-General. °10 Various stat-
utes now exist that authorize independent agency enforcement outside the
control of the Attorney-General. 10 Those statutes may well be unconsti-
tutional attempts by Congress to usurp a power committed to the Presi-
dent's control.102
A fourth implication of incorporation concerns the status of purely in-
vestigatory agencies, such as the United States Commission on Civil
Rights.'03 Buckley made clear that Congress may delegate to an agency,
independent of the presidential power to appoint or remove, the powers
that it could delegate to one of its own committees.' Congress can dele-
gate the power to conduct investigations."0 5 Therefore, even after incorpo-
ration, Congress could create purely investigatory agencies independent of
the executive branch.' 06
100. See supra note 75.
101. See SENArE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 5 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S.
Doc. No. 811, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-67 (1977) (description of supervision by the Justice Depart-
ment of independent agency enforcement) [hereinafter cited as STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION].
This study summarized the enforcement powers of independent agencies:
[T]hree independent regulatory commissions-FERC, FTC, and SEC-have complete or near
complete authority to initiate and conduct lawsuits independent of the Justice Department; five
others-CFTC, CPSC, FMC, FRB, and ICC-have only partial or doubtful authority; and
the remaining agencies (CAB, FCC, and NRC) may not sue in their own name without the
approval of the Attorney General.
Id. at 62. The Civil Aeronautics Board has since been disbanded. See supra note 1. Many of the other
relevant provisions remain in effect. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 56(a) (1982) (enforcement power of the
FTC); id. §§ 77t, 78u(c), 79r(f)-(g), 80a-35, 80a-41(c), 80b-9(c) (enforcement powers of the SEC).
102. It is difficult to predict accurately whether the enforcement power within the executive
branch, after incorporation, would have to be centralized under the control of the Attorney General.
The congressional power under the necessary and proper clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 18, to
establish and shape agency offices is subject to the limiting power of the courts to say what the law is,
and more particularly to say what the constitutional imperatives within the executive branch are. The
sweeping language in Buckley, see supra note 75, suggests a rather strict limit on congressional power
to authorize agency enforcement outside of the discretion of the Attorney General.
Judges, even prior to the emergence of the new formalism, strained to read apparent congressional
grants of enforcement powers to agencies so as to eliminate such grants. See ICC v. Southern Ry., 543
F.2d 534, 536 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding no agency enforcement power); FTC v. Guignon, 390 F.2d
323, 326 (8th Cir. 1968) (same); see also STUDY ON FEDzRAL REGULATION, supra note 101, at
57-62 (review of agency enforcement powers).
103. After the most extensive recent controversy concerning the President's removal power, the
independence of the Commission was confirmed by the United States Commission on Civil Rights Act
of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-183, 97 Stat. 1301 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1975 (West Supp. 1984)). For
a history of the controversy, see 39 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 292-95 (1984).
As another example, transferral out of the General Accounting Office of the Personnel Appeals
Board, which adjudicates Civil Service terminations, may make the GAO exclusively investigatory,
and hence eligible for independence. See 31 U.S.C. § 751 (1982) (provisions for Personnel Appeals
Board). Such investigatory agencies would then be seen as legislative agencies, resembling, for in-
stance, the Congressional Research Service.
104. 424 U.S. 1, 137 (1975) (per curiam).
105. Id. at 137-38.
106. The argument here establishes only that Congress may create an investigatory agency that is
wholly the creature of Congress. The current Commission on Civil Rights is appointed in part by
Congress and in part by the President. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1975(b) (West Supp. 1984). Such a blending of
the two branches would seem impermissible under the new formalism.
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B. Implications of Functionalism for Agency Independence
The functional analysis given above 0 7 took the opinion in Humphrey's
Executor at face value. This analysis assumed the basis of the holding to
be that expertise and impartiality justified independence, and that the de-
mise of those ideals has therefore left independence without any rationale.
These functional arguments for incorporation lead to some, but not neces-
sarily all, of the implications of formalism. The removal power and power
to issue binding executive orders are exactly the means of achieving the
accountability and coordination that would lead a functionalist to accept
incorporation. Allowing investigatory agencies in both the legislative and
executive branches would mesh with a belief in the need for vigilance in
checks and balances. Acceptance of centralization of the enforcement
power would depend on an empirical judgment of the practical effects.
A different reading of Humphrey's Executor, however, would see the
opinion instead as enforcing a check on presidential power.1"8 This more
political reading, which sees agency independence as a limit on the poten-
tially tyrannous imperial presidency,10 9 could lead one to reject incorpora-
tion despite the functionalist (and possibly formalist 1 ) arguments
presented in this Note. This Part suggests three answers to the fear of
excessive presidential power.
First, whatever danger of excessive power that now exists very probably
does not involve the administrative agencies affected by incorporation.
Suspicion of excessive presidential power today arises most forcefully in
areas such as national security and foreign affairs."' The dangers of such
a concentration of presidential power should be addressed directly in the
107. See supra Part II.
108. As noted also by Bruff, supra note 81, at 482, the case was decided the same day as the
strongly anti-presidential A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (dele-
gation to President under National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutionally overbroad).
109. See A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 212 (1973) (rise of dangerous concentra-
tion of power in presidency).
110. The choice between formalism and functionalism, starkly evident in Chadha and Northern
Pipeline, is in large measure a choice between rhetorics. A strong enough threat of an imperial presi-
dency might drive a person with formalist dispositions to accept functional checks on presidential
power; conversely, a perceived threat of erosion of textual guarantees might lead a person with func-
tionalist dispositions to accept the rigidity of formalism.
111. National security and foreign affairs are areas where the secrecy and irrevocability of many
actions make political accountability and reversibility of presidential action by congressional action
especially difficult. See, e.g., Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEx. L. RFv. 785,
837-63 (1984). Presidents have retained the power not only to act swiftly in the event of a crisis, but
also, on issues purportedly impinging on national security, to create general rules with far-ranging
effects. For instance, Presidents have broad discretion to use executive orders to set criteria for classifi-
cation of material. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,065, § 1-4, 3 C.F.R. § 190, 193 (1979) (President
Carter's Order creating general rule of automatic declassification within six years) with Exec. Order
No. 12,356, § 1.4, 3 C.F.R. § 166, 169 (1983) (President Reagan's Order providing for classification
"as long as required by national security considerations"). It is in areas subject to such sweeping
discretion that concerns about excessive presidential power would seem to have the greatest force.
1783
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 1766, 1985
law and politics of those areas, leaving the issue of incorporation to de-
pend on the primarily domestic considerations of health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare. "'
Second, an array of legal checks would remain on presidential control
of agency action. Existing legal constraints on presidential power over
now-executive agencies would apply, after incorporation, to now-
independent agencies. The President would have no power to override
properly promulgated rules within the executive branch,"'3 including
those involving the removal power. 14 Rulemaking affected by presidential
contact would be subject to the usual judicial review. 5 Perhaps most im-
portantly, the inability of the President to remove "employees" such as
administrative law judges, except as provided by statute, would protect the
great bulk of adjudications from political intrusion.1 6
Third, important political checks would remain to prevent arbitrary
presidential action. 7 Congressional and other opponents to presidential
112. Any undesirable concentration of power that would result would be weighed against the
gains from incorporation, such as heightened accountability.
113. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974).
114. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); cf. Nader v.
Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973) (presidential removal of Special Prosecutor held violation of
Justice Department regulation permitting removal only upon finding of extraordinary impropriety).
115. Courts would hold such rulemaking to the usual standard, generally whether the agency
action was arbitrary or capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 706(A) (1982); see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,
407-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (White House contacts, including presidential ones, need not be in record of
informal rulemaking that has substantial factual support on the record). There remains considerable
uncertainty concerning the ways in which the President is exempt from restrictions on ex parte con-
tacts. See Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80
COLUM. L. Rxv. 943, 978-82 (1980).
116. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, administrative law judges, who do the bulk of
agency adjudication, are "employees" removable "for good cause." 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1982). ALJ's
are not agency heads falling under Buckley's substantive definition of "officer." Nor are they close
advisors to the President, instrumental in taking care to execute the laws on his behalf. It thus seems
likely that their status as employees, subject to removal only upon the grounds specified by Congress,
would remain after incorporation.
Two factors should dispel concern about mixing politics with adjudication if the President is per-
mitted to remove agency officers, notably Commissioners, who now often review agency adjudication.
First, such mixing already occurs. The intermingling of rulemaking and adjudication within indepen-
dent agencies has already politicized the officers making the review. See, e.g., Association of Nat'l
Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980) (FTC Com-
missioner, former member of congressional committee staff, permitted to participate in agency
rulemaking absent "irreparably closed mind"). Also, courts have recognized the political components
of adjudicatory decisions of some independent agencies, especially the NLRB. See NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765 (1969) (plurality opinion); see also Scalia, supra note 43, at 407
n.252 (difference in policy component between rulemaking and adjudication not great).
Second, several options are open to those who wish to insulate agency adjudication from the presi-
dential removal power. Congress can at least sometimes provide for decisions to be final below the
agency head level. See J. MASHAW, supra note 46, at 202 (suggesting such a policy for disability
claims). Congress can provide for Article III review directly from the ALJ level. Finally, Congress
can adopt one of the various proposals for an Administrative Court. See B. SCHwARTZ, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW 322-23 (1976).
117. One significant lesson of both Humphrey's Executor and Myers, Administratrix v. United
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action can impose political costs even on actions within a president's legal
power."1" Such a political check may be especially effective concerning
high-visibility positions such as Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board.119 The existence of legal and political checks, and the separation of
administrative agencies from the likely sources of excessive presidential
power, combined with the many arguments favoring incorporation, may
well assuage the fears of those generally reluctant to cede the President
new powers.
CONCLUSION
The decline of expertise and impartiality, and the rise in importance of
presidential coordination of and accountability for agencies, today combine
to justify incorporation on functionalist grounds. Three formalist argu-
ments also favor incorporation: the anomalous position of independent
agencies in a post-functionalist legal landscape; the renascent tripartitism
of the Court; and the constitutional holding that agency heads are officers,
and thus, absent a distinction between executive and independent agencies,
must be executive officers removable by the President.
The effects of incorporation would include the removability at will by
the President of now-independent officers, and his ability to issue execu-
tive orders binding on now-independent agencies. Other possible effects
would be a centralization of the power to bring suit in the name of the
United States, and the preservation of the possibility of purely investiga-
tory agencies outside of the executive branch. The practice of independent
agencies, the perceptions of that practice, and the functionalism that per-
mitted their existence have all undergone great shifts in the half-century
since Humphrey's Executor. If some new basis for independence is not
States (as the case is fully captioned) is in the titles. Suit for back pay is an unfulfilling remedy--one
can literally die waiting for relief. Prospects of judicial relief may thus be less important in fights over
removal than the perceptions of the political actors as to who has legitimate power to remove.
118. For instance, there are historical examples of executive branch officials, within the removal
power of the President, who survived in office based on political support. See W. GEJ.LORN & C.
BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 132-33 (6th ed. 1974); L. FISHER, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONFLIC S BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 94-98 (1985).
119. The possibly high political cost of removing a Federal Reserve Board Chairman suggests
that the effective independence of the Fed may not change very much after incorporation. Three
additional arguments counteract any initial distaste for incorporation of the Fed. First, the change
may not matter. The Fed has rarely departed from presidential policy for any length of time. Kilborn,
Even the Upright Fed Can Sometimes Nod to Politics, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1983, § 4, at 4, col 3.
Second, the change may not matter much. Any costs of incorporating the Fed may be outweighed by
the benefits described elsewhere in this Note. Third, if the change matters, it may be for the best.
Both Democrats and Republicans have noted the incongruity of a Fed that is accountable to the
financial community rather than to elected officials. Hershey, The Fed Draws Fire From Many
Fronts, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § 4, at 5, col. 1; Nichols, Remove the Freedom to Snub Congress,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1983, § 3, at 2, col. 4.
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found, then the incorporation advocated by this Note seems the only prin-
cipled, and most desirable, alternative.
-Peter P. Swire
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